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Larry Alexander* 
At a recent meeting of the Association of American Law 
Schools in Miami, I chaired a symposium on "the Constitution as 
hard law."1 The responses of the panelists to the topic were all over 
• Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I wish to acknowledge the helpful com-
ments of Leo Katz, Rich Pildisa, and Fred Schauer. 
I. I introduced the topic of the section on Constitutional Law as follows: 
Many argue that the Constitution has served us well for 200 years because, in 
addition to its content, which many other countries have copied and even improved 
upon, it is treated as "hard law," that is, as law in the ordinary sense. Put differ-
ently, the Constitution is treated as ordinary law in that its text is treated like any 
other legal text and interpreted through a methodology that, like the methodology 
used to interpret a stop sign, often makes possible agreement on its meaning among 
adherents of different politicaVmoral philosophies. 
The problem with the Constitution interpreted through such a methodology is 
that the Constitution turns out to be imperfect from the point of view of practically 
anyone's political and moral ideals. It permits--and may even require--considera-
ble injustice and imprudence. But if that is so, then one wonders how the Constitu-
tion can be regarded as authoritative. 
Seeking to preserve the Constitution's authority, many have repudiated meth-
odologies of constitutional interpretation associated with ordinary legal texts-with 
"hard law." They have argued instead that we "interpret" the Constitution by 
looking to the most general, abstract purposes behind it, or by treating it as a collec-
tion of "contested concepts," or by rejecting reliance on the text or its framers en-
tirely. The Constitution will become perfectible and authoritative because it will 
become identical with correct political and moral ideals (those held by the propo-
nent of this approach). 
Moreover, many of those in the perfectionist camp reject as ultimately impossi-
ble the interpretive methodologies of hard law. Relying upon Continental decon-
structionists or upon Wittgensteinian critiques of rule-following, they deny that the 
hard law methodologies can ever succeed in constraining the politicaVmoral 
choices of the present decisionmaker, even if the prior decision to be interpreted is 
the decisionmaker's own decision and occurred in the immediate past. Interpreting 
a prior decision is always a matter of political/moral choice. Hard law is a theoreti-
cal impossibility. 
Those who regard the Constitution as hard law to be interpreted as is other 
hard law respond that the perfectionists' methodology, by undermining the hard 
law view of the Constitution, undermines the Constitution's efficacy. For the per-
fectionists, the Constitution amounts to no more than the redundant entreaty to do 
what's just, good, and wise. But law that is "interpreted" so that it is always just, 
good, and wise--perfect-in the eyes of the interpreter fails to fulfill the moral role 
that makes law valuable. That role is to decide and settle, at least temporarily, what 
is just, good, and right, even if the decision is viewed by some as incorrect. Law 
cannot do this--cannot be "law"-if its "meaning" is always treated by it various 
interpreters as what is really just, good, and right in their eyes. In other words, law 
cannot fulfill the moral function signified by the notion of "a society of laws, not of 
men," if its interpretive methodology leaves it unsettled to the extent that political 
and moral debates remain unsettled. The proper methodology for interpreting law 
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the map. Some believed that I had posed a false dilemma. For ex-
ample, Cass Sunstein argued for some sort of Dworkinian middle 
way between "the rules" and "the right." I have written elsewhere 
about why I believe Dworkin's enterprise is wrongheaded, and what 
I said applies equally to neo-Dworkinian approaches like Sun-
stein's.2 Mark Tushnet also assumed that I misstated the problem, 
not because there is no such problem, but because it arises in private 
law as well as in constitutional law. I was quite aware, however, as 
my reference to the positivism/natural law debate makes clear, that 
the same issue applies to all law, not just constitutional law. 
Other panelists' responses were at the margins of the topic I 
presented. Jack Balkin pointed out that, given stare decisis and the 
practice of granting the judiciary final authority in interpreting the 
Constitution, the practical meaning of the Constitution, if not its 
original meaning, will change over time. Balkin correctly con-
cludes, therefore, that a view of the Constitution as hard law entails 
change, not stability, over time, at least if one assumes judicial final-
ity and the practice of following precedent. 
Richard Kay's paj,er dealt with the relative authority of the 
Constitution's text vis-a-vis the intentions of its authors, concluding 
that their intentions should be viewed as supremely authoritative. 
In contrast to Kay, Michael Moore drew a distinction between the-
ories of the Constitution's authority and theories of its interpreta-
tion. Bracketing the question of why the Constitution is 
authoritative, Moore proceeded to defend his natural law theory of 
interpretation. (Moore's theory of interpretation starts with word 
meaning, which Moore links to the word's reference and not its 
sense, and then qualifies word meaning by considerations of func-
tion, precedent, and a residual "not too evil" limitation.) I will 
come back to Moore and Kay in the final part of this paper. For the 
is one that preserves its status as law by creating the possibility that the law to be 
interpreted will be less than perfect in some, and perhaps in all, eyes. Therefore, if 
the Constitution has served and will serve us well because it is law, its nature as law 
must not be undermined by perfectionist methods. An imperfect Constitution is 
more "perfect" than a perfect Constitution. 
This debate between the proponents of a hard law view of the Constitution and 
the proponents of perfectionist methodologies of interpretation essentially replays 
the fundamental jurisprudential debate between positivism and natural law over the 
nature of law and its relation to what is just, this time with the U.S. Constitution 
and its interpretation as its centerpiece. The natural lawyers claim that only just 
law is authoritative. The positivists claim that only by separating law and morals 
(and "interpreting" law so that such a separation is possible) can law fulfill its moral 
role of settling moral issues; a natural law view of law paradoxically undermines the 
moral value of law. The natural lawyers reply that the positivist enterprise is 
doomed by the presence of political/moral choice in all interpretive acts. And so 
on. 
2. Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's 
Theory of Law, 6 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 419 (1987). 
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moment I will make only two comments about their responses. 
First, they both bracket the question of the Constitution's authority 
and thus avoid wrestling with the dilemma I posed. Second, theo-
ries of authority and theories of interpretation cannot be separated. 
The remaining panelists all took on the central dilemma that I 
posed. Erwin Chemerinsky acknowledged the tension between con-
straint and flexibility, pronounced it insoluble in theory, and then 
came down on the side of flexibility with at least two cheers (and I 
suspect three). Fred Schauer, on the other hand, although ostensi-
bly only posing the question of whether we should view the Consti-
tution as a rule, an entrenched generalization, that we should follow 
even when it prescribes imperfect results, seemed clearly to favor 
the answer that indeed we should prefer to be ruled by rules.J I 
think that Fred gave at least one and a half cheers to the opposite 
hom of the dilemma from that seized by Erwin. My colleague, 
Maimon Schwarzschild, warmly embraced the whole dilemma. He, 
like Erwin, saw it to be insoluble, and, like Erwin, he saw the virtue 
of viewing the Constitution as flexible and inspirational rather than 
as hard law. But, like Fred, he also saw the virtue of viewing the 
Constitution as a set of constraining rules, as a keel as well as a sail. 
For Maimon, constitutional law is ultimately a paradox, a muddle, 
a matter of correct intuitive balance that cannot be made a matter 
of precise formula. Maimon is a devotee of the British philosopher 
Isaiah Berlin, who deems values to be plural and incommensurable, 
and who consequently denies that all good things are part of the 
same good thing. 
My intuition is that Berlin and Schwarzschild are correct, 
though the system builder in me recoils at the idea of irreconcilable 
values and choices unguidable by formula. At present, I have found 
no way to resolve the dilemma I posed. In what follows, however, I 
want to present it more extensively than I have previously and to 
show what the problem of the Constitution's authority4 is and how 
it relates to the problem of interpretation. 
I 
What follows is going to be overly simplified, though I hope 
not simple minded. 
3. See also, Schauer, Formalism 97 YALE L. J. 509 (1988); Schauer, The Jurisprudence 
of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REV. 847 (1987); Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 41 (1987). 
4. I have discussed the relation between the Constitution and practical authority in 
several prior articles. See e.g., Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: Noninterpretive 
Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 447,458-62 (1983); Alexander, Modern Equal Protec-
tion Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 4-16 (1981). 
106 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:103 
The problem of authority arises because of controversy within 
a society regarding what ought to be done. There may and likely 
will be controversy at the level of ultimate political/moral princi-
ples. But even if there is society-wide agreement at that level-even 
if, for example, everyone in a society accepted John Rawls's theory 
of justice5 or Jeremy Bentham's version of utilitarianism6.-there 
would still be controversy over which more particular norms, ac-
tions, and decisions were required by that theory. The solution is to 
grant authority to persons or institutions to decide what ought to be 
done both in general and in particular cases. A society of more 
than a handful of people will need not only authoritative decisions 
resolving particular disputes, but also authoritative decisions about 
broad categories of cases, that is, general rules. (Enough has been 
said about the rule of law virtues of predictability/stability/con-
straint-of-decisionmakers so that I don't have to explain why they 
are virtues in any large society and why, therefore, it is good to have 
general rules.) Interestingly, much of what is trendy in current 
legal scholarship views the abstract, general quality of legal rules as 
something to be overcome rather than as something to be sought. 
Legal rules are not as richly textured as life. But we wouldn't want 
them to be.7 
The function of authorities and authoritative decisions is to re-
place the ultimate political/moral principles that justify particular 
actions by norms that are to preempt those principles in people's 
deliberations about what to do. There is thus a strong connection 
between authority and formalism, since it is the nature of formal 
rules that they are opaque to the more general principles that lie 
behind them. 
At the apex of the hierarchy of authoritative norms are those 
that we may deem "constitutional." These are the norms that de-
fine authoritative institutions, their powers and limits, how and by 
whom their products shall be authoritatively interpreted, and per-
haps how these constitutional norms may be changed. Some consti-
tutional norms may be embodied in texts, as in the United States; 
but in any society some constitutional norms will be non-textual, 
and in some societies (such as Great Britain) all constitutional 
norms will be non-textual. What Richard Kay calls "preconstitu-
5. ]. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
6. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA· 
TION (1789). 
7. They would fail to perform their function if they were too particularized. Indeed, 
it's hard to believe that those who criticize legal rules for their abstract generality don't favor 
precise speed limits, statutes of limitations, or precise times for beginning classes. 
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tional rules"B-norms about how the written Constitution should 
be interpreted, who shall have the final say about its interpretation, 
and whether the principle of stare decisis applies to constitutional 
interpretations-! would call constitutional norms that are merely 
unwritten. These constitutional norms derive their authority 
merely from their acceptance by members of society. For those 
who do not accept them, they are not authoritative, though there 
may be reasons for those who do not accept their authority to com-
ply with them. 
What is the ultimate test for whether one should accept as au-
thoritative a certain set of constitutional norms? Although many 
theories of political obligation have been put on the table-consent 
theories of both express and tacit varieties, fairness theories, respect 
for authority theories, and, in earlier times, divine right theories-! 
believe that only one kind of argument succeeds in justifying the 
authority of constitutional norms, and that is a consequentialist ar-
gument. Simply put, we justify a constitutional arrangement by 
showing that adherence to that arrangement will work out for the 
best, the best being defined by whatever politicaVmoral theory we 
accept. Thus, if we are Rawlsians, we justify a constitutional ar-
rangement by showing that in the long run, adherence to the ar-
rangement will best promote realization of Rawls's principles (and 
will not violate any Rawlsian side-constraints). In other words, a 
choice of constitutional norms is in large part strategic. It is based 
on a calculation of whether adherence to those norms will over time 
bring us closer to the state of affairs that our political/moral beliefs 
deem desirable than alternative constitutional arrangements. 
Now the dilemma of law arises from the fact that at both the 
constitutional and non-constitutional levels, the authoritative rules 
and decisions may be incorrect in terms of the political/moral the-
ory that we accept. There are two ways in which the authoritative 
rules can be incorrect, though I will argue that they are really just 
two versions of the same way. 
The first way in which the authoritative rules may be incorrect 
is straightforward: the rules are not the rules that we should have 
chosen to govern us. There is another set of rules that is better in 
terms of our ultimate political/moral theory. 
The second way in which the authoritative rules may be incor-
rect lies in the very nature of formal rules, their opacity to the rea-
sons that generated them. Once our ultimate political/moral 
considerations have led us to promulgate a rule, the rule's function 
8. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981). 
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is to preempt further recourse to those considerations. We are to 
abide by the rule, not the reasons behind it. Now the consequence 
is that application of the rules will sometimes lead to results that 
conflict with the results that correct application of the underlying 
political/moral principles would yield. The very aspects of rules 
that make them capable of noncontroversial application and thus a 
solution to controversy over political/moral principles also make 
even the best rules diverge from their underlying political/moral 
bases in some applications. It is to be expected that even the best 
rules will produce results at odds with those that the best political/ 
moral principles would produce when correctly applied. 
We now have the outline of the dilemma posed by authorita-
tive rules. Our political/moral principles, unmediated by authorita-
tive rules, will generate controversy, unpredictability, instability, 
unconstrained decisionmaking, and so forth. On their own terms, 
these principles require that they be mediated by authoritative rules 
that are to preempt these principles in decisionmakers' delibera-
tions. But a decisionmaker will, in some instances, get a different 
result under an authoritative rule from the result dictated by the 
unmediated political/moral principles. Reasons require rules that 
require results different from the results required by the reasons. 
The dilemma facing decisionmakers under authoritative rules 
can be softened somewhat by the recognition that departure from 
the authoritative rules may undermine those rules and produce 
worse consequences (in terms of the political/moral principles) than 
adherence will produce. This fact narrows the gap between what 
the rules require and what the reasons require, though, as I have 
pointed out in another piece, it does not eliminate that gap.9 Ulti-
mately one has to face the paradox that there are reasons to have 
rules and to base decisions on them rather than on their underlying 
reasons, and there are reasons-ultimately the same reasons-to de-
part from the rules in particular cases.1o 
I want to return at this point to the first way in which authori-
tative rules may be incorrect, that is, when they are inferior to an 
alternative set of rules. We might think that in such a case the 
course of action we should adopt is clear: we should refuse to rec-
ognize the authority of the inferior rules and instead operate under 
the superior alternative set. But things are not quite so simple. We 
may conclude that a set of rules claiming to be authoritative is the 
best set we can get others to agree to, even if it is not the best set we 
9. Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 (1985). 
10. /d. See also M. DETMOLD, THE UNITY OF LAW AND MORALITY (1984), esp. 252-
59. 
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can imagine. Or we may conclude that the costs in terms of our 
political/moral principles of seeking agreement on a superior set of 
rules outweigh the costs of sticking with an inferior set of rules. For 
example, no one may believe that the Constitution is an ideal set of 
authoritative rules in terms of his or her own political/moral princi-
ples. But everyone may believe that the Constitution is, in terms of 
those same principles, the best set of authoritative rules that it is 
possible to get everyone, or enough others, to accept as authorita-
tive. Thus, in the real, imperfect world, the Constitution may be 
ideal. What this shows is that the first way in which authoritative 
rules may be incorrect is really just an instance of the second way. 
What appears to be an incorrect set of authoritative rules may be 
the correct set given the constraints of the real world, which include 
the costs of getting people to agree to a particular set of authorita-
tive rules.tt 
As an aside here, my colleague, Chris Wonnell, has recently 
published an article distinguishing what might be called ideal polit-
ical theory and real-world political theory, a distinction that 
roughly parallels my distinction between political/moral theories 
directly applied and political/moral theories mediated by authorita-
tive rules and institutions.12 The point I wish to make is that the 
relation of the ways in which authoritative rules may be incorrect 
shows that these are not just two levels of political/moral theory, 
but an indefinite number of such levels, each defined by how many 
real world constraints are assumed. Even what Chris deems ideal 
political/moral theory usually assumes some real world con-
straints-for example, that human beings are corporeal, that they 
face scarcity, and so forth. Working down from that level, the vari-
ous levels of political/moral theory build in more and more facts 
about the world, such as limitations on information, normal motiva-
tional structures, in-place institutional and cultural forms, and so 
forth. 
One final point before moving from the problems of authority 
to the problems of interpretation. Suppose that at time one we de-
cide that a certain set of constitutional rules will be authoritative for 
us. Does that decision have any privileged status, or should we con-
II. Put slightly differently, the real world constraints that make acting directly under 
one's political/moral principles inferior to acting on the basis of authoritative rules also make 
agreeing to a moderately decent set of authoritative rules superior to holding out for an ideal 
set of authoritative rules. Or, to put the point still differently, the proper meta-rule for choos-
ing a set of rules to be authoritative is to choose that set among those that can gamer general 
acceptance that is best under one's political/moral principles so long as it is superior to acting 
without a set of authoritative rules. 
12. Wonnell, Problems in the Application of Political Philosophy to Law, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 123 (1987). 
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sider ourselves free at any time to reconsider the authority of those 
rules? Of course, any reconsideration will have to face the costs of 
abandoning one set of rules as authoritative in favor of another, 
costs that will in general create a presumption in favor of the rules 
chosen at time one. But the costs of change may turn out to be low 
enough relative to the benefits, in which case reconsideration of our 
earlier decision will produce a different decision. Are there none-
theless reasons for not reconsidering? 
The troubling answer, I believe, is that there are reasons 
against reconsidering.J3 The benefits produced by authoritative 
rules dissipate substantially if the rules are too easily changed. A 
rule that is not entrenched temporally is not a rule at all.14 If we 
can reconsider authoritative rules at any and thus at all times, then 
we lose the stability and predictability the rules are designed to 
bring. The same point holds for constitutional rules. Yet, on the 
other hand, is it not irrational not to reconsider rules when the ben-
efits of reconsideration outweigh the costs, including the costs to 
stability engendered by the reconsideration itself?Js 
What this means for the authority of constitutional rules is 
that, on the one hand, their authority is always assessed from the 
perspective of the present, yet on the other hand, their authority 
may spring from an earlier decision that we at present are rationally 
disposed not to reconsider. Constitutional authority is a rational 
irrationality, a paradox, a muddle. 
II 
In this section I'm going to relate what I've said about consti-
tutional authority to the debate over interpretation. I'm much more 
13. See Bratman, "Personal Policies," Working Paper RR-8, Center for Philosophy and 
Public Policy (1987); DETMOLD, supra note 10 at 127-28. 
14. On temporal entrenchment, see Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: 
Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 A.B.F. RES. J. 379. 
15. It seems irrational both never to reconsider decisions about authoritative rules and 
always to reconsider them. In our personal life as well, it seems irrational both never to 
reconsider our plans and always to reconsider them. The problem is that it also seems impos-
sible to know when to reconsider without engaging in the reconsideration. We want to have 
the proper disposition with respect to reconsidering our decisions, but whether we have it 
depends upon knowledge that the disposition may properly prevent us from obtaining. Infor-
mation is one commodity, the costs of obtaining which cannot be appraised in its absence. 
See Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 LAW & 
PHILOSOPHY I, 18-19 (1987). 
Even perfectionists must have a rule determining when to cease acquiring additional 
information regarding what course of action to take. That rule may in any given case dictate 
the wrong decision. But the perfectionist cannot know whether the rule is correctly terminat-
ing further inquiry without engaging in the very inquiry the rule is supposed to terminate. 
This point was suggested to me by Leo Katz. 
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uncertain of the terrain here, and my conclusions are quite tenta-
tive, to put it mildly. I will state these conclusions, if they can be 
called such, in a brief, sketchy fashion. 
First, although Michael Moore suggested in his paper that the 
theory of a text's authority and the theory of its interpretation are 
separate matters, I can't see how they can be. In deeming a text to 
be authoritative for us, we must have in mind, if not what the text 
means, at least how its meaning will be ascertained. Indeed, to 
deem something a text and not just a parchment with ink marks 
already is to adopt an interpretive methodology. Looked at another 
way, we choose an interpretive methodology to be authoritative at 
the same time we choose a text to be authoritative, and both the text 
and its interpretive methodology are part of the complete set of au-
thoritative norms that we must choose. 
Second, our choice of interpretive methodologies ultimately 
must be based on the same kind of consequentialist reasoning on 
which our other decisions concerning authority are based: what 
will best promote our political/moral ideals in the long run. To 
give one example, if we believe that the framers of the Constitution 
were divinely inspired, we would give far more weight to the specific 
meaning they attached to words and to how they would have clari-
fied the ambiguities, contradictions, vague terms, and gaps in the 
Constitution's text than we might otherwise. 
Third, our decisions regarding what shall be our authoritative 
and constitutional norms-since they are not themselves embodied 
in a text, but are meta-textual-must be "interpreted" according to 
our "original intentions"; indeed, they are nothing but our original 
intentions. 
Fourth, despite the Wittgensteinian and deconstructionist criti-
ques, words can and do constrain.'6 Texts can be more determinant 
than political/moral theories, and they can therefore perform the 
function of furthering the ends of political/moral theories by elimi-
nating destructive controversy over what those theories require. 
Both Marxists and anarchists-and everyone in between--can un-
derstand the meaning of a stop sign without resort to their moral 
theories. 
Fifth, consistent with the points made in the previous section, 
it would not be morally ideal for us to interpret texts in terms of 
their ultimate purpose of furthering correct political/moral princi-
ples. In other words, we should not ignore the text in favor of the 
16. See Schauer, Formalism 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); Yablon, Law and Metaphysics, 96 
YALE L.J. 613 (1987); Solum, On the lnterdeterminancy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
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ultimate purposes behind it, even if we judge the text to be mistaken 
in terms of those purposes. To do so defeats the very purpose of 
having authoritative texts and thus in some sense defeats the pur-
poses behind the text in the name of furthering them. 
Sixth, the real debate over interpretation then is where proper 
interpretation is located in relation to the following two polar posi-
tions: at one pole, the text is to be read with only minimal contex-
tual assumptions, such as that the words are in a particular 
language, that they mean what a standard contemporaneous dic-
tionary would say they mean, and so forth; at the other pole, the 
text is to be read as Richard Posner has recently advocated, that is, 
as evidence of a superior authority's plan,17 like orders from a com-
manding general to a field officer. At this polar position, we would 
ideally replace the text with an ongoing conference call to the text's 
authors if we only could do so. Their intentions, not the text, are 
what really matters on this position. 
Actually, the Posnerian position is too extreme to be within the 
field of play of a tenable theory of interpretation for constitutional 
texts. First, government-by-conference-call does not produce the 
stability and predictability that authoritative norms should produce. 
Second, if we as law appliers are in constant communication with 
the lawmakers, we can point out to them how their "original" or-
ders rest on mistaken factual, logical, or normative assumptions and 
thus should be revised to further their ultimate purpose, which is to 
do what is right, just, good, and wise. Is Not only does this make for 
instability, it also allows the subordinate law applier to justify doing 
whatever she thinks is right, just, good, and wise in the name of 
carrying out the superior's orders. 
Therefore, the extreme Posnerian model must be rejected. The 
range of choices is now narrowed. The intent of the framers must 
be honored on any theory, at least to the extent that their intent to 
create a text, their intent to write the text in English, and their in-
tent to rely on other minimal contextual assumptions are assumed. 
On the other hand, when the terms they employed are ambiguous, 
vague, internally contradictory, destructive of their obvious low-
level purposes, or evil or absurd, there can be legitimate disagree-
ment over whether we should interpret the text as seems best, or 
whether we should interpret the text as the framers would have 
wanted us. If we take the latter tack, we must then decide what 
17. Posner, Legal Formalism. Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 37 CASE WEST. L. REv. 179 (1986). 
18. See Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review, 
supra note 4 at 451-54. 
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assumptions about the framers' informational bases we should make 
in attributing the requisite counter-factual desires to them. 
Similarly, there is legitimate disagreement over how far we 
should carry the implications of what is in the text beyond what the 
text constrains us to do. Should we read the text to cover new prac-
tices that are closely analogous to practices clearly covered? Should 
we draw out the implications even further?t9 On the one hand, we 
need to avoid making texts immediately obsolete because of crabbed 
readings. On the other hand, too much implication destroys the 
distinction between textual and nontextual decisionmaking and 
hence the stabilizing function of texts. It also leads to the problem 
that Dworkin faces of creating an imperative to do evil so as to 
cohere with existing evil texts. There is a justification for clear 
rules, even if they are incorrect. There is no justification for con-
structing from such rules, and then extending, principles that are 
both incorrect and controversiat.2o 
Finally, the interpretive debates over whether terms should be 
interpreted according to their psychological sense or according to 
their real world reference2t must also be resolved by asking which 
approach best furthers the consequentialist function of drafting au-
thoritative norms. Michael Moore has made a strong case on con-
sequentialist grounds against the kind of intentionalist approaches 
advocated by Kay and Posner and in favor of finding the meaning 
of legal texts in the best theories of those things to which the texts 
refer. I'm not sure where I come out on this debate.22 I do agree 
with Moore that ultimately a theory of constitutional interpretation 
is justified by its consequences in terms of our political/moral ide-
als. And that is how it links up with the theory of the Constitu-
tion's authority. 
19. Two closely related questions-perhaps even the same question put differently-are 
what is the default position when the constitutional text does not explicitly cover an issue, 
and how is that default position related to the background assumptions of the framers? 
20. See Alexander, supra note 2 at 427-31. 
21. See Kress, The Interpretive Turn, 97 ETHICS 834, 858-59 (1987). 
22. See Alexander, supra note 2 at 426 n.l4. 
